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Ian Blue, Q.C.* Off the Grid: Jurisdiction and the
Canadian Electricity Sector
The author argues that the federal government should empower the National
Energy Board to regulate transmission access on provincial electricity systems
including the authority to order a provincial utility to construct new facilities,
for the purpose of creating a truly national electricity system and facilitating
interprovincial and international electricity sales. First, because Canada needs a
national regulator who can address the creeping Americanization of the Canadian
electricity sector arising from the U.S. legislation and decisions of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. Second, because Canada needs a national body
to facilitate the movement of non-greenhouse gas sources of electricity to markets
where it can displace fossil-fired electricity; and, third, because Canada needs
a neutral regulator to decide transmission-access disputes between utilities in
different provinces. In showing why the federal government can do this, the author
analyzes the constitutional provisions and jurisprudence on federal and provincial
jurisdiction over electricity He points out .that the recently discussed Quebec-
New Brunswick deal provides a perfect rationale for conferring this jurisdiction on.
the National Energy Board.
L'auteur all~gue que le gouvernement federal devrait donner j l'Office national
de I'6nergie le pouvoir de r6glementer I'acces J la transmission sur les reseaux
6lectriques provinciaux, notamment le pouvoir dordonner i une soci6t6 publique
provinciale de construire de nouvelles installations afin de mettre en place un
r6seau 5lectrique v6ritablement national et de faciliter les ventes d'6lectricite
interprovinciales et internationales. II avance trois motifs. Premi~rement, le Canada
a besoin dune autorit6 nationale de reglementation pour contrer Iamericanisation
insidieuse du secteur canadien de I'6nergie qui r~sulte des lois am6ricaines et
des d~cisions de la Federal Energy Regulatory Commission des E-tats-Unis.
Deuxi~mement, le Canada a besoin dun organisme national pour faciliter le
transport d'6lectricite propre (provenant de sources qui ne produisent pas de gaz
A effet de serre) jusquaux march6s o& elle peut remplacer I'6lectricit6 produite
A partir de combustibles fossiles. Enfin, le Canada a besoin d'une autorit6 de
r~glementation impartiale qui tranchera les diff6rends entre les services publics
des diverses provinces. En expliquant pourquoi le gouvernement f6d6ral peut
donner ce pouvoir a I'Office national de I'6nergie, Iauteur analyse les dispositions
constitutionnelles et la jurisprudence surles comp~tences f6derales etprovinciales
en mati~re d'61ectricit6. // souligne que la transaction entre le Quebec et le
Nouveau-Brunswick dont il a r~cemment 6t6 question constitue une justification
id6ale pour accorder ce pouvoir a IOffice national de I'6nergie.
* A partner of Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP; a senior commercial litigator and energy
lawyer.
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Introduction
Three interrelated issues facing Canada's electricity sector require timely
federal leadership and action. First, there is the creeping Americanization
of Canada's electricity systems which has taken place since 1995. Second,
there is the integration of the North American electricity grid and the need to
transmit new non-GHG (greenhouse gas) sources of electricity generation,
including hydro, tidal and wind power, across provincial and international
borders to markets burning fossil fuels. Third, there is the potential of
deals like the recently cancelled Quebec-New Brunswick deal' which
would have allowed Hydro-Qurbec to effectively control the electricity
interfaces between Canada and the United States in eastern Canada.
Instead of ten separate but ineffective provincial responses to these
challenges, Canada needs to create a national electricity regulator which
can administer the national electricity grid, develop a national electricity
policy and resolve transmission access issues.
I. Historical and legislative background
Canada has no national electricity grid, as such. Each province operates
its own electricity system, and with the exception of Alberta,2 Nova Scotia3
and Prince Edward Island,4 the principal utilities are owned by provincial
I. Shawn McCarthy & Rh~al S~guin, "N.B., Quebec's ambitions for power fizzle out" The Globe
and Mail (25 March 2010).
2. In Alberta, the electricity utilities include ATCO Electric Ltd., EPCOR Energy and TransAlta
Utilities.
3. In Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia Power owned by EMERA Inc. provides about 97% of all electricity
and transmission.
4. In P.E.I., Maritime Electric Limited owned by Fortis Inc. provides virtually all of the electricity
and transmission. It purchases some 52 MW of wind generation from private sector wind farms.
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governments.' In every province, electricity utilities are regulated by a
provincially-constituted regulatory authority.6
Provincial governments have considered their electricity systems
to be fiefs to be exploited for provincial revenue, provincial economic
development and occasional patronage purposes. Since 1961, they
have resisted federal attempts to create multi-provincial or national
electricity organizations in Canada.7 The best example of a provincial
claim of complete control of its electricity system is, arguably, Premier
Jean Lesage's 1965 statement about Quebec's condition for co-operation
with Newfoundland in developing Labrador's Churchill Falls electricity
potential:
T]he primary and absolute condition is that all energy that will enter
Quebec becomes property of Hydro-Quebec.
That condition ... has always been the same, and we will never negotiate
from another base. We will never permit, under any condition, others
to build a transmission line on Quebec.territory, or let others transport
the energy produced at Churchill Falls whatever the destination of that
energy, whether it be the United States or the other provinces
5. Newfoundland and Labrador: Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, owned by Nalcor, the
provincially-owned energy company.
New Brunswick: The publicly-owned N B Power Group, consisting of Holdco, Genco, Nuclearco,
Transco and Disco, all separate corporations.
Quebec: Publicly-owned Hydro-Quebec divided into Hydro-Qudbec Production, Hydro-Qurbec
TransEnergie and Hydro-Qudbec Distribution, all separate corporations.
Ontario: Publicly-owned Ontario Power Generation and Hydro One Networks, separate
corporations. In addition, Ontario has other generators including Bruce Power Inc., Algonquin
Power, Epcor Power, Enwave Energy Corporation, TransCanada Energy and several municipal
distribution with their own generation and several small wind farms and cogeneration projects.
Manitoba: Publicly-owned Manitoba Hydro, still a vertically-integrated utility.
Saskatchewan: Publicly-owned Saskatchewan Power, still a vertically-integrated utility.
British Columbia: Publicly-owned BC Hydro, BC Transmission Corporation and British
Columbia Power Exchange, separate corporations.
6. Newfoundland and Labrador- Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities
Prince Edward Island - Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission
Nova Scotia - Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board
New Brunswick - Energy and Utilities Board
Quebec - R~gie de l'6nergie
Ontario - Ontario Energy Board
Manitoba - Public Utilities Board
Saskatchewan - Rate Review Panel
Alberta - Alberta Utilities Commission
British Columbia - British Columbia Utilities Commission
7. This story is told in Karl Froschauer, White Gold, Hydroelectric Power in Canada (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 1999) at 22-54.
8. Ibid. at 37, quoted from Le Devoir.
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This position, along with similar claims to provincial autonomy from
Ontario when it embarked on its nuclear program, have likely discouraged
federal thoughts about trying to regulate the electricity sector more closely
in the Canadian public interest and this history will be a challenge for the
recommendations in this paper.
The National Energy Board Act 9 is the only federal legislation that
regulates electricity utilities. Part III. 1 of the Act prescribes the process
for obtaining approval of international power lines and allows provincial
approval processes to apply to the construction of the portion of the
international power line lying within the province. It also allows a utility to
elect to have the whole international power line approved by the NEB.' 0
Only one section deals with interprovincial power lines. Section 58.4,
enacted in 1990, states:
Interprovincial Power Lines
58.4 (1) The Governor in Council may make orders
(a) designating an interprovincial power line as an
interprovincial power line that is to be constructed and
operated under and in accordance with a certificate
issued under section 58.16; or
(b) specifying considerations to which the Board shall
have regard in deciding whether to issue such a
certificate.
(2) No person shall construct or operate any section or part of
an interprovincial power line in respect of which an order
made under subsection (1) is in force except under and in
accordance with a certificate issued under section 58.16."
Section 58.4 has never been used. It requires the federal cabinet to make
an order-in-council before the NEB can act. The federal cabinet can
legally make an order-in-council with respect to any new interprovincial
interconnection and the NEB would then have jurisdiction to grant or deny
approval.
Part VI of the NEB Act regulates electricity exports from Canada, and
Part VII provides for NEB regulation of the interprovincial oil and gas
9. R.S.C. 1985, c. N-7, as amended [NEB Act].
10. National Energy Board.
I1. Supra note 9 at s. 58.4.
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trade should the federal cabinet opt to authorize it. There is, however, no
similar mechanism to authorize the NEB to regulate the interprovincial
electricity trade. Nor are there any provisions authorizing the NEB to
regulate rates or tariffs for interprovincial or international power lines
even though Part IV of the NEB Act authorizes it to regulate those very
matters for natural gas and oil pipelines. Instead, rates and tariffs on
interprovincial and international power lines are regulated by the ten
separate provincial regulatory authorities. 2
II. Americanization
At the present time, all Canadian electricity utilities follow rules of the
United States, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 3 Why
is that?
Canadian utilities have always wanted to export surplus electricity
to markets in the United States. The United States, however, has had a
much different electrification history than we have had in Canada. Where
Canadian utilities have grown into large publicly-owned, province-wide
entities, United States utilities were broken up into smaller investor-
owned companies. 4 In the 1970s, Congress deemed this structure to be
inefficient and to have resulted in electricity prices that were too high for
United States electricity consumers.
In 1978, the United States Congress enacted the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).15 It intended PURPA to encourage more
energy-efficient and environmentally-friendly energy production, and to
lower electricity prices. For the first time, electricity utilities in the United
States were required to buy non-self-generated electricity. Immediately,
transmission access issues arose regarding interstate transmission systems
when non-utility generators wished to use a utility's transmission system
to sell to customers in that utility's or another utility's service area.
Section 205(b) of the United States Federal Power Act (FPA) 16 prohibited
a utility from subjecting any person to any undue disadvantage in respect
of transmission, but did not provide a mechanism FERC could use to
overcome such disadvantage.
In 1992, Congress remedied this situation when it enacted the Energy
Policy Act of 1992.'1 Title VII - Electricity added sections 211 to 213to
12. Supra note 9.
13. Created by the Department of Energy Organization Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 569.
14. For how this happened, see: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Public Utilities Holding
Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992 (January, 1993).
15. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
16. U.S.C. tit. 16 § 824d (1935).
17. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2779.
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the FPA which gave FERC the authority to grant third parties access to a
utility's transmission system in order to deliver electricity to loads either
within that utility's own service area or in that of another utility.
Section 211 was wide enough to apply to Canadian utilities who
wanted access on interstate transmission lines. In 1994, however, FERC
staff began to complain about Canadian utilities (at that time all vertically
integrated) obtaining access to United States transmission lines when they
did not grant reciprocal rights to other electricity shippers in Canada.'8 On
April 24, 1996, FERC issued Order No. 88819 requiring all public utilities
that owned, controlled or operated facilities used for transmitting electric
energy in interstate commence to have on file Open Access Transmission
Tariffs (OATTs) that contained minimum terms and conditions of non-
discriminatory service. FERC said that its goal was to remove impediments
to'competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring more
efficient, lower cost power to American electricity consumers.
Meanwhile, despite the hostile FERC staff, Canadian electricity utilities
had been happily selling electricity into the United States electricity market.
Then on 23 October 1995, while the Order No. 888 rule-making was in
play, FERC surprised everyone with Energy Alliance Partnership2
Energy Alliance Partnership was owned one-third by Hydro-Qudbec
Energy Services (U.S.) Inc. It had filed an application with FERC under
section 205 of the FPA for authorization to act as an electricity marketer
at market-based rates. Hydro-Qurbec Energy Services (U.S.) Inc. was
wholly-owned by Services d'tnergie H.Q. Inc., in turn wholly-owned
by Hydro-Qurbec, which, as FERC noted, was wholly-owned by the
government of Quebec. Energy Alliance argued that it did not intend to
act as Hydro-Qudbec's agent nor to market Hydro-Qurbec electricity, and
that executives and employees would be independent of Hydro-Qurbec,
dealing with it only at arm'slength. It argued that if Hydro-Qurbec sold
electricity to Energy Alliance, the transmission, interconnection, and other
services necessary to deliver it through Canada into the United States
would be provided through negotiated transmission agreements drawn up
in accordance with Canadian law. FERC, however, found that Hydro-
18. Record of the author's 1994 telephone discussion with Mr. Bud Ford, then a lawyer with Ontario
Hydro.
19. FERC Orders No. 888, Docket No. RM 95-8-000 and RM 94-7-001 (March 1996). Since
1946, s. 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, U.S.C., c. 5, requires all United States government
agencies, including FERC, to publish a public notice-of a new proposed regulation in the United States
Federal Register, hold a proceeding respecting the proposed new rule and give interested persons an
opportunity to be heard about it. The period between publication and going into force must be at least
thirty days. FERC Orders contain the text of the new regulations.
20. 73 FERC 61019 (1995).
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Quebec exercised too much market power and dismissed the application,
saying:
We disagree that Hydro-Qu~bec's facilities are irrelevant to our analysis.
The fact that these transmission facilities are located in Canada does not
diminish the possibility that Energy Alliance's competitors may require
transmission service from Hydro-Qu6bec to reach United States markets.
The Commission's concern is not transmission service to serve Canadian
loads - it is transmission to serve United States loads. Entities may
wish to locate in Canada, but sell to United States utilities, or entities
may wish to market Canadian power in the United States, and they may
require Hydro Quebec's transmission service in order to do so.2
FERC thereby applied domestic United States law to a Canadian utility
because of the way it was organized in Canada!
About six weeks after Order No. 888, FERC approved TransAlta
Energy Corporation's 2 application under section 205 of the Federal Power
Act to sell electricity in the United States at market-based rates. FERC
noted that the electricity utility business in Alberta had been restructured
in 1995 and that there was an Alberta Independent System Operator which
addressed any market power concerns. On 15 January 1997, FERC in
BC Power Exchange Corporation23 rejected Powerex's application
under section 205 to sell electricity at market-based rates because of BC
Hydro's market power as a vertically-integrated electricity utility. On 31
March 1997, FERC in Ontario Hydro Interconnected,2 4 rejected Ontario
Hydro's application under section 205 to sell electricity at market-based
rates because of Ontario Hydro's transmission market power. On 9 May
1997, in H.Q. Energy Services (U.S.) Inc.,25 FERC again rejected a Hydro-
Quebec subsidiary's request under section 205 to sell electricity at market-
based rates, again because of concerns about Hydro-Qu6bec's generation
market power.
These decisions sent a clear message to all Canadian electricity utilities:
if they wanted to sell electricity in the United States, they had to organize
within Canada in a way that removed their generation and transmission
"market power." These decisions were made against Canadian-owned
companies, based on the way they were organized in Canada. That form
of organization, the vertically-integrated electricity utility, was what had
allowed the economies of scale and efficiencies, resulting in Canada's
2 1. Ibid. at 61,031.
22. FERC Doduments, Docket No. ER 96-1316-000.
23. FERC Documents, Docket No. ER 97-556-000.
24. FERC Documents, Docket No. ER 97-852-000.
25. FERC Documents, Docket No. ER 97-851-000.
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low-cost electricity. They thus hit at Canada's competitive advantage in
electricity.
So in 1997, Hydro-Qu6bec decided to cede complete control of its
transmission system, and obtained provincial approval of an OATT 6 in the
form prescribed by FERC.27 FERC subsequently agreed that H.Q. Energy
had satisfied "the Commission's standards for MBR authority.""8 In 1997,
B.C. Hydro too issued an OATT identical in all material respects to the
FERC pro forma transmission tariff. FERC therefore granted Powerex's
renewed application under section 205 to sell electricity in the United
States at market-based rates. 29 In 1998, Ontario reorganized its electricity
system to conform to FERC norms in the Electricity Act, 199830 and the
Ontario Energy BoardAct, 1998."1 FERC then found that Ontario Energy
Trading International Corp., a subsidiary of Ontario Power Generation,
satisfied the Commission's standards for market-based rates authority.
32
Since 1998, all other Canadian electricity utilities have filed and,
where applicable, obtained approval of OATTs.33 In 1999, FERC backed
off slightly during its Regional Transmission Organization proceedings
when it was proposing rules that seemed to consider Canada as part of
the United States. Natural Resources Canada, through the Canadian
Embassy, reminded FERC of Canadian sovereignty34 and FERC modified
26. O.C. 276-97, G.O.Q. 1997.11.97 1.
27. One wonders what Jean Lesage would have thought.
28. FERC Documents, Docket No. ER 97-851-015.
29. FERC Documents, Docket No. EL 98-64-000.
30. S.O. 1998, c. 15, Sched. A.
31. S.O. 1998, c. 15, Sched. B.
32. E.g., Docket No. ER 08-580-000.
33. In 1997, Manitoba Hydro published an OATT but never submitted it for approval to either the
Manitoba Public Utilities Board or the NEB. The Public Utilities Board has directed Manitoba Hydro
to file its OATT for approval but to date Manitoba Hydro has demurred. Manitoba's OATT is almost
identical to the FERC Pro Forma OATT. In 2001, SaskPower published an OATT but it was not
subject to any third party approval. It is almost identical to the FERC Pro Forma OATT. On June 21,
2002, NB Power requested provincial approval of its OATT. On March 13, 2003, it was approved by
the New Brunswick Board of Public Utility Commissioners to go into effect on September 30, 2003.
It is almost identical to the FERC Pro Forma OATT. On May 12, 2004, Nova Scotia Power Inc.
requested provincial approval of its OATI'. On May 9, 2005, the Nova Scotia Utilities and Review
Board approved it. It is almost identical to FERC Pro Forma OATT. On October 3, 2007, Maritime
Electric filed an OATT. On February 26, 2009, it was approved by The Island Regulatory and Appeals
Commission (Order UE09-01). It is almost identical to FERC Pro Forma OATT.
34. Department of Natural Resources Canada, Commentary on The Notice ofProposedRulemaking-
Regional Transmission Organizations (19 August 1999) in letter from Raymond Chrdtien, Ambassador
to the United States to James Hoecker, Chairman of the FERC (18 August 1999) in FERC Docket No.
RM 99-2-000.
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its rules.35 FERC rules subsequent to 1999, however, have been followed
by provincial utilities.3
6
Commenting on these developments in 2001, J. Owen Saunders made
the following observations:
The more general point is that the FERC, through its rulings on
reciprocity of access, has had an important influence on the structuring
of the Canadian electricity industry (for example, in the restructuring
of Hydro-Qu6bec in response to the above-noted litigation). Moreover,
it has exercised this influence while all the time insisting that it was
deferring to the jurisdiction of Canadian regulators in Canada. What
the FERC was essentially doing in its rulings, however, was overruling
the principle of national treatment set out in the NAFTA (and the GATT)
and replacing it with the principle of reciprocity. Put differently, it was
replacing the principle of free trade with the principle of fair trade, with
FERC as the adjudicator of what is fair.
A number of solutions exist to deal with the growing potential for
transnational regulatory disputes. An international treaty, while holding
some attraction owing to the legal certainty it would introduce, may for
various reasons not prove possible. However, there are other options
which do hold some potential. One such option would be the conclusion
of a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the
United States and Canada that would set in place some process for at
least recognizing the international character of some energy regulatory
actions.37
We will return to this suggestion of a Canada-U.S. MOU below.
III. Integration and the need to move to non-GHG sources of electricity"5
Despite being administered by ten separate entities, Canadian electricity
utilities are physically interconnected with each other and with adjoining
U.S. states and are part of the integrated North American electricity grid.
An NEB vice-chair has noted the increasing interconnectedness of the
35. FERC Order 2000, December 20, 1999, 18 CFR 35.28.
36. E.g. FERC Order 2004, November 25, 2003 and FERC Order 717, May 29, 2007 re Standards
of Conduct.
37. J. Owen Saunders, "NorthAmerican Deregulation of Electricity: Sharing Regulatory Sovereignty"
(2001) 36 Tex. Int'l L.J. 167 at 171-173.
38. I am indebted to William K. (Bill) Marshall, P.Eng. with whom I had the pleasure of working
when he was at NB Power, for inspiring and assisting with this section.
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North American grid and the need for strong reliable practices.39 This
need was accentuated by the 14 August 2003 North American blackout.4°
As a result of this blackout and the Recommendations of the U.S.-
Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Congress added section 215
to the United States FPA creating an Electric Reliability Organization and
directing FERC to choose one.4' FERC chose NERC Corp., a wholly
owned subsidiary of the North American Reliability Council. 42 In Canada,
the NEB and every province subsequently chose NERC Corp. as their
reliability organization as well.43
Because of the interconnections between provinces and with the
United States operating on the same reliability standards, Canada has one
physically integrated electricity grid. But, again, this system is regulated
by ten different regulatory authorities, each pursuing its own rather than
the national interest.
At the same time, the pressure by utilities in one province to transmit
electricity across the provincial boundaries of other provinces has never
been greater. P.E.I., New Brunswick and Nova Scotia want to transmit
electricity from their wind farms to displace fossil fuel in markets outside
their provinces. Nova Scotia also wants to transmit tidal electricity some
day. Newfoundland and Labrador want to be able to transmit hydro
electricity from the Lower Churchill in Labrador to markets elsewhere in
Cahada or the United States. If we truly believe in the need to confront
climate change with available non-GHG electricity, then it is indisputably
in the Canadian public interest that these interprovincial transfers be
facilitated and allowed to take place.
39. Sheila Leggett, "Interprovincial and International Electricity Transmission" (Presented to the
Canadian Nuclear Society, Calgary, 3 June 2009) [unpublished].
40. U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the Implementation of the Task
Force Recommendations (Natural Resources Canada, U.S. Department of Energy, September 2006).
41. Energy PolicyAct of 2005 Pub. L. No. 109-58, [2005] U.S.C. C.A.N. 119 Stat. 594, s. 1211(a).
42. In proceeding Docket No. RR06-1-000.
43. The MOUs signed with NERC Corp. by Canadian entities may be summarized as follows:
NEB - MOU signed September 14, 2006
Nova Scotia - MOU signed December 22, 2006
New Brunswick - MOU signed October 3, 2008
Quebec - MOU signed May 8, 2009
Ontario - By legislation on May 14, 2008
Manitoba - By legislation in June, 2009
Saskatchewan - Undated MOU
Alberta - By regulation
British Columbia - By legislation on May 1, 2008
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IV. The Quebec-New Brunswick deal
On 29 October 2009 Quebec and New Brunswick took Canadians by
surprise by announcing that they had been exploring opportunities
for co-operation in the areas of accessibility, transmission and market
opportunities and had reached agreement under which Hydro-Qu6bec
would acquire substantially all of the assets of NB Power, except for the
Belledune and Coleson Cove generation units, and most importantly, NB
Power's transmission facilities. The independent New Brunswick System
Operator (NBSO) who ensures non-discriminatory transmission access
would be eliminated and its functions taken over by Hydro-Qu6bec. In
return, Hydro-Qudbec would pay $4.75 billion, an amount sufficient to
discharge NB Power's debt. Electricity rates would be fixed for five years
for residential and commercial classes and reduced for large industry, and
tolling agreements would be entered into with the retained generation
facilities.44 Due to public opposition to this deal within New Brunswick,
the agreement was modified to allow Hydro-Qu6bec to acquire NB
Power's generation assets with their firm transmission rights in return for
$3.2 billion. Now NB Power would retain ownership of the distribution
business and maintain its rate reductions. Transmission would remain in
NB Power's hands with its operation under the independent but probably
Finlandized NBSO. Hydro-Quebec would act as a wholesaler for NB
Power which will remain but in a much diminished form.4 5 On 24 March,
2010, Premier Graham announced that the deal had been cancelled due to
disagreement about additional demands from Quebec.46
While the deal would have been advantageous for New Brunswick 47
and Quebec, it would have meant that Hydro-Quebec would have
effectively controlled all the electricity interfaces between provinces
in eastern Canada and between the northeast United States and eastern
Canada. This was deeply disquieting to the government of Newfoundland
and Labrador48 whose ability to sell electricity from the Lower Churchill
in Labrador depends upon transmission access through either Quebec or
New Brunswick and has had a historically poisonous relationship. with
44. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of New Brunswick and the Government
of Quebec (29 October 2009).
45. "Quebec's NB Power deal cut to $3.2B" CBC News (20. January 2010), online: CBC News
<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/new-brunswick/story/2010/01/20/nb-power-hydro-quebec-deal.html>.
46. "Quebec balked at NB Power sale costs" CBC News (24 March 2010), online: CBC News
<http://www.cbc.ca/canadalnew-brunswick/story/2010/03/24/nb-nbpower-grahaml 027.html>.
47. New Brunswick and Quebec, "Final Report of the Advisory Panel on the Proposed New
Brunswick-Quebec Electricity Transaction" (I February 2010) at 6.
48. Ibid. at 15.
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Quebec and Hydro-Qu6bec as a result of Quebec's position on Churchill
Falls electricity since the 1960s.49
It is unlikely that Canada has heard the last of this deal because the
stakes for Quebec are too high for it to give up completely.
At the time of writing, Nalcor, Newfoundland and Labrador's
public energy company, is in a dispute with Hydro-Qu6bec respecting
electricity from the proposed Lower Churchill development. Because of
-the dysfunctional relationship between Quebec and Newfoundland and
Labrador,50 this current dispute will have unpleasant national dimensions.
Appearing before Quebec's R6gie de l'Energie ("R6gie"), Nalcor argued
that Hydro-Quebec was making it difficult for Nalcor to get transmission
access on Hydro-Qu6bec's system. As alluded to earlier, Nalcor wants
to build a $6.5-billion hydroelectric project called Lower Churchill,
downstream from Churchill Falls, and sell the bulk of the electricity
produced there to markets in the United States Northeast, Ontario and
New Brunswick. It wants to secure access, for export purposes, on Hydro-
Qu6bec's and NB Power's transmission systems, under their Open Access
Transmission Tariffs.
If the Hydro-Qu6bec and NB Power agreement were to come into
operation, Nalcor and electricity producers from other provinces would
be competing with an interprovincial Hydro-Qu6bec and what could be
described as an adjunct NB Power.
V. Constitutional issues and jurisprudence
An integrated electricity grid or the combined Hydro-Qudbec and NB
Power electricity systems would fall under federal jurisdiction. This
is because of two provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867: first, the
combined effect of sections 92(10)(a) and 91(29); and second, section
91(2).
At first glance, electricity systems appear to be local works and
undertakings within provincial jurisdiction under section 92(10) of the
Constitution Act, 1867. It states:
49. See: For example, Bertrand Marotte, "Nalcor's last-ditch effort for a better hydro deal" Globe
and Mail (24 February 2010) 39.
50. See: R. in Right of Newfoundland v. Commission Hydro-Electrique de Quebec, [1982] 2 S.C.R.
79; Reference Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [ 1984] 1 S.C.R. 297; Hydro-Quebec v.
Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp., [1988]1 S.C.R. 1087.
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Exclusive Powers of Provincial Legislatures
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws
in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next
hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,.
10. Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the
following classes: -
a. Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals,
Telegraphs, and other Works and Undertakings connecting
the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or
extending beyond the Limits of the Province:
b. Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any
British or Foreign Country:
c. Such Works as, although wholly situate within the
Province, are before or after their Execution declared by
the Parliament of Canada to be for the general Advantage
of Canada or for the Advantage of Two or more of the
Provinces.5'
Section 92(1 0)(a), however, excludes from provincial jurisdiction "Lines of
Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, and other Works and undertakings
connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or
extending beyond the Limits of the Province." Section 92(10)(c) also
excludes nuclear facilities in Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick since
they have been declared to be works for the general advantage of Canada. 2
These excepted facilities then fall under exclusive federal jurisdiction
under section 91(29) of the Constitution Act, 1867. It states:
VI. DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS
Power of the Parliament
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace,
Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not
coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively
to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not
so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section,
it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the
51. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.
52. Nuclear Energy Act, S.C. c. A-16, s. 18; Ontario Hydro infra note 78 at 362-363.
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exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends
to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next herein-after
enumerated; that is to say,-
1.
29. Such Classes of Subjects are as expressly excepted in the
Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively
to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
Any matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated
in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters
of a local or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes
of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the
Provinces. 3
Section 91(29) and the closing words of section 91 establish that the
exceptions to provincial jurisdiction over works and undertakings are
within exclusive federal jurisdiction.
In applying sections 92(10)(a) and 91(29), the courts have held that
natural gas and oil pipelines,54 telephone companies,55 cable television
systems,56 and railways57 crossing provincial boundaries (or integrally-
connected with similar enterprises that do cross provincial boundaries) all
fall under federal jurisdiction.
This jurisprudence has established a set of principles to be applied
when trying to determine whether facilities, say, an electricity system
which appears to be under provincial jurisdiction, really is under federal
jurisdiction. The key ones are as follows:
An activity conducted on facilities located entirely within a province
is prima facie a "local work or undertaking" within provincial
jurisdiction. 8 Parliament may assert jurisdiction over such an activity
though when it is also an integral part of something within federal
53. Supra note 52 at s. 91.
54. Campbell-Bennett Ltd. v. Comstock Mihvestern Ltd, [1954] S.C.R. 207; Saskatchewan Power
Corp.v. TransCanada Pipelines Ltd., [1979] I S.C.R. 297; Flamborough (Township o) v. National
Energy Boardet al. (1984), 55 N.R. 95 (F.C.A.) [Flamborough].
55. Toronto (City o0) v. Bell Telephone Co., [1905] A.C. 52; Alberta Government Telephones v.
C.R.TC., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 225.
56. Capital Cities Comm. v. C.R.TC., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141; Public Service Board v. Dionne, [1978]
2 S.C.R. 191 [Dionne].
57. Luscar Collieries Ltd. v. McDonald, [1927] A.C. 925 (P.C.); R. v. Board of Transport
Commissioners, [1968] S.C.R. 118 [Board of Transport].
58. Re Ontario Energy Board(1986), 57 O.R. (2d) 281 (Div.Ct.) at 290.
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competence.5 9
" The person asserting federal jurisdiction has the onus to show
that the activity in question is so integrated .with a federal work or
undertaking that it falls under federal jurisdiction.61
* Mere physical connection between two facilities, only one of which
is under federal jurisdiction, is not sufficient by itself to bring the
other facility within federal jurisdiction. 6'
* Ownership or control of aspects of an operation which occurs in
more than one province is not, by itself, determinative.62
* Common control, direction and management of an intra provincial
collection and gathering system that is an integral part of an
interprovincial system will put the intra provincial system under
federal jurisdiction.63
" If it can be said that there is, in reality, one interprovincial undertaking,
the entire activity will fall within federal jurisdiction. The question
is not whether one portion can be stripped away without interfering
with the whole, but rather whether the activity, as it is in- fact being
carried on, is really one undertaking.
Under another test, the court will consider whether one set of facilities
is a "link in the chain" of an interprovincial undertaking. Under this
test, though, it may be necessary that the various links of the chain
be in the same or related operational control.6" It must either be
an interprovincial work or undertaking (the primary instance) or be
joined to an interprovincial work or undertaking through a necessary
nexus (the secondary instance).65
To this point we have seen how sections 92(10)(a) and 91(29) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 operate to bring facilities within a province under
federal jurisdiction. In the jurisprudence from which the above principles
59. Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Communications Workers., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 115 at 132, Dickson J.; Re
Ontario Energy Board, ibid. at 290-291.
60. Re Ontario Energy Board, ibid. at 291.
61. British Columbia Electric Ry. Co. Ltd. v. Canadian National Ry. Co., [1932] S.C.R. 161 at 170;
Re Ontario Energy Board, ibid. at 292.
62. McAfee v. Irving Refining Ltd (1970), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 729 (N.B.A.D.) at 735; Dome Petroleum
Ltd. v. National Energy Board (1987), 73 N.R. 135 (F.C.A.) [Dome] at 139; Consolidated Fastfrate
infra note 84.
63. Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1998] S.C.R. 322 at paras. 77-79.
64. Luscar Collieries Ltd. v. McDonald, [1927] A.C. 925 (P.C.) at 932-933; Capital Cities
Communications v. CRTC, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 at 153-163; Dionne, supra note 56 at 196-198.
65. Re National Energy BoardAct, [1988] 2 F.C. 196 (C.A.) at 216.
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have been distilled, an important factor favouring federal jurisdiction was
the presence of federal legislation which regulated the works in issue and
"occupied the field."
Jurisprudence on the electricity sector has not been as extensive as that
on pipelines, railways, telephones and cable television. This has given
some support to the position of the provinces that their electricity systems
are under provincial jurisdiction. Is this really so?
For example, in Hull Electric,66 Hull City Council granted the Ottawa
Electric Company a franchise to supply electricity in Hull. Ten years later,
in 1897, it also granted a franchise to the Hull Electric Company. The city
by-law granting the 1897 franchise was subsequently incorporated into a
Quebec statute. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) held
that the Hull Electric's rights were paramount. It said:
The scheme in favour of which By-law No. 61 was passed was a purely
local undertaking. As such it came within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the provincial legislature, and not the less so because in such cases it is
usual and probably essential for the success of the undertaking to exclude
for a limited time the competition of rival traders. 67
Hull Electric, therefore, established that an electricity system within a
province is a local work or undertaking under provincial jurisdiction.
In a second example, Hewson,68 the Ontario Power Company had been
incorporated under a federal special act which stated that it was a company
for the general advantage of Canada or for two or more provinces. Mr.
Hewson, fighting expropriation under the company's statutory rights to take
property for its works, argued that no federal act could authorize someone
to construct a purely intra-provincial project, in this case, a power canal
between the Welland and Niagara Rivers in Ontario.
Davies J. disagreed and said as follows:
Mr. Lafleur felt himselfobliged to contend that the local legislature could
grant similar powers of connection, and.I was disposed at the argument
to agree with him. But a closer examination of the clauses of the British
North America Act, 1867, has led me to entertain very grave doubts that
this is so. It seems clear to me that the legislature could not grant a local
company power to connect its wires with those of a local company in
any of the other provinces. If it could each company would cease to
be one of a "local or private nature" and become interprovincial and
general. How then could the legislature grant power to connect the wires
of the company it was creating with those of the companies of a foreign
66. Hull Electric Co. v. Ottawa Electric Co., [1902] A.C. 237 (P.C.).
67. Ibid. at 247.
68. Hewson v. Ontario Power Co. (1905), 36 S.C.R. 596.
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country. The local or private company on such connection taking place
would at once cease to be "local or private" within the British North
America Act, 1867, and become international.*
It is not necessary, however, for me to decide whether a grant by the
legislature of the province to a company created by it to connect its wires
with those of a foreign corporation, at the frontier, would be necessarily
beyond its powers or would invalidate the charter altogether or simply
in part. That question was not argued excepting incidentally because the
validity of a provincial charter was not an issue on this appeal. Whether
there exists a concurrent jurisdiction in the Dominion and the province
to confer such a power I am not called upon now to decide. I do hold
the power to exist in the Dominion Parliament; and that, because of its
exercise with respect to this special corporation and also because of the
general extent of the powers granted, the Act of incorporation here in
question is legal and valid.
Hewson established that the Parliament of Canada has jurisdiction over an
interprovincial electricity utility. It held that Parliament can regulate the
facilities of such a utility even if they are wholly within a province.
Two other developments. were decisions of the Ontario Court of
Appeal: Ottawa Valley69 and Beauharnois.7 ° In these cases Ontario Hydro
had negotiated power purchase and joint facility development agreements
with Ottawa Valley Power and Beauharnois Light respectively, both
investor-owned utilities in Quebec. Everyone borrowed substantial
amounts and commenced construction. After the 1934 Ontario election,
however, the Hepburn Liberals had the Ontario legislature enact statutes
which purported to nullify the agreements. The companies contended
that these deal-ending statutes were invalid. The Attorney General of the
province replied that the Ontario legislature had never had the jurisdiction
to authorize Ontario Hydro to enter into the agreements in the first place
because the joint facilities were section 92(10)(a) and 91(29) works under
federal jurisdiction - not a weak argument!
In Beauharnois, Rose C.J.H.C. followed the Court of Appeal's decision
in the companion Ottawa Valley case, and said:
It was contended that neither the Commission nor the company,
each of them being a provincial corporation, had capacity to enter into
the agreements; that the Province of Ontario had not, by The Power
69. Ottawa Valley Power Co. v. The Hydro-Electric Power Commission, [1937] O.R. 265.
70. Beauharnois Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd.. v. The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of
Ontario, [1937] O.R. 796.
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Commission Act, professed to endow the Commission with such capacity;
that, regard being had to sec. 92(10)(a) of The British North America Act,
a province cannot confer power to carry on the operation of transmitting
electrical energy across the boundary between two provinces; and that what
one province cannot do separately two provinces acting in concert cannot
accomplish. But the Court decided that the Power Contract was valid and
enforceable; and that decision settles for a trial Judge in Ontario the question
as to the initial validity of the contract sued upon in the present case. If it
was within the power of the Commission to enter into the Power Contract,
tied up as it was with the Joint Development Agreement, by which the
Commission bound itself to join in the development and utilization of the
water power of an interprovincial river, and with the Operating Contract,
by which the Commission bound itself to operate a plant in Quebec, there
can be no question of the power of the Commission, by the contract sued
upon in this action, to bind itself to pay for power kept available for it and,
if demanded, delivered to it by the Beauhamois Company.71
Beauharnois and Ottawa Valley stand for the proposition that provincial
electricity utilities in different provinces may enter into agreements with
each other for joint facilities development. Once such agreements are
entered into, however, the legislature of one of the counter-partiesis not
competent to abrogate them because they create rights in the other province
beyond its reach. Beauharnois and Ottawa Valley were followed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion
Act72 when Newfoundland tried to use legislation to withdraw water rights
supporting the Churchill Falls agreement with Hydro-Qudbec.
In Fulton,73 the Supreme Court of Canada had to decide whether a
transmission line in southernAlberta built for the purpose of interconnecting
with BC Hydro was under federal or provincial legislative jurisdiction. The
interconnection with BC Hydro was to provide several system benefits to
both parties. In addition, it would facilitate the export of electricity to the
United States. Each company was to construct separately its transmission
line to the British Columbia-Alberta border. Each company was to retain
control of, and responsibility for, its transmission line together with the
ability to connect or disconnect it to the rest of its system at will. Laskin
C.J.C., after considering the sections 92(10)(a) and 91(29) jurisprudence
cited above, held that the proposed power line and other works "may
71. Ibid. at812.
72. [1984] I S.C.R. 297 at 329-331.
73. Fulton v. Energy Resources Conservation Board, [1981] I S.C.R. 153.
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properly be regarded as local works for the purposes of the application that
was before the [Alberta] Energy Resources Conservation Board."74
In effect, Fulton authorized provincial electricity utilities to construct
interconnection facilities with interprovincial and international trade
purposes. Laskin C.J.C. emphasized, however, that he so held only because
there was no operative federal'legislation which occupied the field. He
accepted that such federal legislation would be valid and paramount if
.enacted by Parliament.75
This brings us to section 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867 added to
the Constitution in 1982. The relevant portions state:
92A. (1) In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws
in relation to
(c) development, ... and management of sites and
facilities in the province for the generation and
production of electrical energy.
(2) In each provihce, the legislature may make laws in
relation to the export from the province to another part
of Canada of .... the production from facilities in the
province for the generation of electrical energy ....
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) derogates from the authority
of Parliament to enact laws in relation to the matters
referred to in that subsection and, where such a law of
Parliament and a law of a province conflict, the law of
Parliament prevails to the extent of the conflict.76
74. Ibid. at 166.
75. Ibid. at 161-65. As an essential read, see also: Nigel D. Bankes, Constance D. Hunt & J. Owen
Saunders, "Energy and Natural Resources - The Canadian Constitutional Framework" in Mark
Krasnick, ed., Case Studies in the Division of Powers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986)
53 at 97-100. Here the authors discuss the Fulton case in a manner similar to the way I have done,
but go on to make the point that former section 90.1 of the NEB Act, superseded by the present and
similar section 58.4 quoted above and referred to in footnote 11, was added to the NEB Act at the
request of Calgary Power. They also observed that it did not give the NEB any authority over existing
interprovincial transmission lines and that the reasoning behind the federal government's decision not
to give the NEB such authority:
"seems a little thin in the light of a dispute [the 1980 Newfoundland-Quebec dispute] that
clearly raises the question of the national economic interest and free passage of good and
resources through provinces"
76. Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 50.
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La Forest J. explained section 92A in Ontario Hydro." The issue in this
case was the question as to who had jurisdiction over the employees of
Ontario Hydro's nuclear generating stations: the Canada Labour Relations
Board or the Ontario Labour Relations Board. For the majority, La Forest
J. held that the jurisdiction was federal because labour relations are an
integral component of the operation and management of a federal work.78
Important for present purposes are his comments about section 92A.
He said:
It must be confessed that s. 92A(1), including para. (c), do not, at least
at first sight, appear to add much to the broad and general catalogue
of provincial powers; see P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada
(3rd ed. 1992) vol. 1 at p. 29-19. So it is tempting to seek additional
meaning from the provision. It may be, however, that s. 92A(1) is merely
preliminary to the provisions that follow; although, as I will indicate,
it, at a minimum, fortifies the pre-existing provincial powers. There is
reason to think this was one of its major goals ....
Most commentators mention only these issues in describing the
background against which s. 92A was enacted, but there were others,
specifically in relation to the generation, production and exporting of
electrical energy, that must have been seen as a threat to provincial
autonomy in these areas. In most of the provinces, at least, the generation
and distribution of electrical energy is done by the same undertaking.
There is an integrated and interconnected system beginning at the
generating plant and extending to its ultimate destination. There was
authority that indicated that even an emergency interprovincial grid
system might effect an interconnection between utilities sufficient to
make the whole system a work connecting or extending beyond the
province, and so falling within federal jurisdiction within the meaning of
s. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867; see British Columbia Power
Corp. v. Attorney General of British Columbia (1963), 44 W.W.R. 65
(B.C.S.C.). More importantly, provincial power commissions supply
electrical energy to other provinces and the United States on "a regular
and continuing basis", which a number of cases in other areas have held
to be sufficient to make an integrated undertaking fall within federal
legislative competence: see, for example, Re Tank Truck Transport Ltd.
(1960), 25 D.L.R. (2d) 161 (Ont. H.C.), aff'd [1963] 1 O.R. 272 (C.A.).
There was danger, then, that at least the supply system and conceivably
the whole undertaking, from production to export, could be viewed as
being a federal undertaking. For a discussion of these problems as they
appeared in the period preceding the enactment of s. 92A, see G.V. La
Forest and Associates, Water Law in Canada (1973) at pp. 46 et seq.,
77. Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327 at 375 [Ontario
Hydro].
78. Ibid. at 478.
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esp. at pp. 50-1, 53-6. While a number of commentators, including
myself, did not share this view of the law, the result on the authorities
was by no means certain. The express grant of legislative power over the
development of facilities for the generation and production of electrical
energy (s. 92A(l)(c)), coupled with the legislative power in relation to
the export of electrical energy offers at least comfort for the position that,
leaving aside other heads of power, the development, conservation and
management of generating facilities fall exclusively within provincial
competence. The nature of provincial electrical generating and
distribution systems at the time of the passing of s. 92A must have been
appreciated.
What is important to note is that the danger to provincial autonomy over
the generation of electrical energy did not arise out of the discretion
Parliament had or might in future exercise under its declaratory power.
The danger, rather, lay in the possible transformation of these enterprises
into purely federal undertakings by reason of their connection or
extension beyond the province. Section 92A ensures the province the
management, including the regulation of labour relations, of the sites
and facilities for the generation and production of electrical energy that
might otherwise be threatened by s. 92(10)(a). But I cannot believe it
was meant to interfere with the paramount power vested in Parliament by
virtue of the declaratory power (or for that matter Parliament s general
power to legislate for the peace, order and good government of Canada)
over "[a]ll works and undertakings constructed for the production, use
and application of atomic energy ". This, as already seen, comprises the
management of these facilities, displacing any management powers the
province might otherwise have had under s. 92A. And a vital part of the
power of management is the power to regulate labour relations.7 9
He held, in effect, that section 92A did nothing to diminish the jurisdiction
possessed by Parliament when section 92A was enacted.
In Westcoast Energy, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed this view.
For the majority, Iacobucci and Major JJ. said as follows:
In our view, [La Forest, J.'s] comments apply with equal force to
Parliament's jurisdiction over interprovincial transportation undertakings
under s. 92(10)(a). Section 92A does not derogate from Parliament's
jurisdiction under s. 92(10)(a). °
It should be noted that Westcoast Energy also strongly suggests that
transmission lines of a provincial utility from generating stations to
load centres would also be under federal jurisdiction if under common
79. Ibid. at 376-377 [emphasis added].
.80. Wesicoast Energy Inc., supra note 63 at para. 82.
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management, direction and control with interprovincial transmission
lines.
In Maritime Electric,8 the Town of Summerside applied to the then
P.E.I. Public Utilities Commission for transmission access on the submarine
cable connecting New Brunswick with P.E.I. The submarine cable was
owned by the province of P.E.I. and leased by Maritime Electric Co. Ltd.
The Court held that the P.E.I. legislature did not have jurisdiction over this
submarine cable because it was a section 92(10)(a) and 91(29) work.82 In
distinguishing the Fulton case, the court said as follows:
The undertaking here is interprovincial as it not only connects two
provinces but passes through territory not 'under the legislative
competence of either province. The fact situation in Fulton makes it
inapplicable to this case. Neither is the fact that 100% of the output
may be used in Prince Edward Island determinative of whether or not
the undertaking should be classified as a local undertaking subject to
provincial jurisdiction.83
Finally, in Consolidated Fastfrate, Rothstein J. said as follows:
The common thread among the enumerated transportation works and
undertakings in s. 92(10)(a) [- "Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways,
Canals" -] is the interprovincial transport of goods or persons. The
enumerated examples are all instruments of or means of facilitating
actual transport. There is no reference to, or implication of, third parties
connected to the means of actual transport through contract being
subject to federal jurisdiction. The genus of transportation works and
undertakings contemplated in s. 92(10)(a) as "connecting the Province
with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits
of the Province" consist of those that physically connect the provinces
through transport, not those that nationally connect them through
contract. The basket clause "other Works and Undertakings" is to be
read ejusdem generis with the specific examples which precede it.84
Since interprovincial and international transmission lines physically
connect one province with another or extend beyond the limits of a
province, Consolidated Fastfrate supports the principles which we have
just reviewed.
From the above analysis it may be concluded that provincial legislatures
have exclusive jurisdiction over their non-nuclear generating facilities.
81. Re Town of Summerside and Maritime Electric Co. Ltd. (No.2) (1983), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (P.E.I.
Sup. Ct., en banc).
82. Ibid. at 593.
83. Ibid at 585.
84. Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada Council of Teamsters, 2009 SCC 53, [2009] 3
S.C.R. 407 at para. 43 [emphasis added].
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One may also conclude that provincial legislatures have non-exclusive
jurisdiction over transmission lines and distribution lines that are under
common control, direction and management with transmission lines and
distribution lines in another province." The combined Hydro-Qudbec and
NB Power facility would be caught by these principles and for that reason
would be subject to federal jurisdiction. The presence of section 58.486 of
the NEB Act is probably as good an indication as any that federal lawyers
agree with this conclusion.
Let us now turn to the section 91(2) jurisprudence, which would
apply to any interprovincial movement of electricity and to the Hydro-
Quebec-NB Power undertaking. Section 91(2) ("The Regulation of Trade
and Commerce") applies to inter-provincial trade as has been stated in
numerous decisions commencing with Parsons7 . There, the JCPC said
that the words "The Regulation of Trade and Commerce" in s. 91(2)
included "regulation of trade in matters of inter-provincial concern, and
it may be that they would include general regulation of trade affecting
the whole Dominion" but not so as to "comprehend the power to regulate
by legislation the contracts of a particular business or trade, such as the
business of fire insurance in a single province,
In .Lawson,89 Duff J. said about s. 9 1(2):
there is no lack of authority for the proposition that regulations governing
external trade.., as well as regulations in matters affected with an inter-
provincial interest.., are within the purview of that head.90
In Natural Products Marketing Act, 9' Duff C.J.C. said:
the regulation of trade and commerce does not comprise, in the sense
in which it is used in section 91, the regulation of particular trades or
occupations or a particular kind of business.., or the regulation of trade
in particular commodities or classes of commodities in so far as it is
local in the provincial sense; while, on the other hand, it does embrace
the regulation of external trade and the regulation of interprovincial
trade.. 92
85. As mentioned earlier, the Parliament of Canada has exclusive jurisdiction over nuclear
facilities.
86. Supra note 9 at s. 58.4.
87. Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons [1881] 7 A.C. 96 (P.C.).
88. Ibid at 113.
89. Lawson v. Interior Tree Fruit & Vegetable Committee, [1931] S.C.R. 357.
90. Ibid. at 366.
91. Reference Re Natural Products Marketing Act (Canada), [1936] S.C.R. 398.
92. Ibid. at 410 [emphasis added].
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The limits of any provincial regulatory control in this field are emphasized
in the words of Duff, C.J.C., "trade which is entirely local and of purely
local concern," and the JCPC approved this view. Lord Atkin said "There
can be no doubt that the provisions of the Act cover transactions in any
natural product which are completed within the Province, and have no
connection with inter-Provincial or export trade."93
In Shannon,94 Lord Atkin added:
It is now well settled that the enumeration in s. 91 of "the regulation
of trade and commerce" as a class of subject over which the Dominion
has exclusive legislative powers does not give power to regulate for
legitimate Provincial purposes particular trades or businesses so far as
the trade or business is confined to the Provinces.... 95
In Willis,9 6 Rinfret C.J.C. stated that the marketing of agricultural products
outside the province in interprovincial and export trade were "two
subject matters which are undoubtedly Within [federal] constitutional
authority."97
. In Re The Farm Products Marketing Act,98 the limits on federal and
provincial power in the regulation of agricultural trade were further
explored. Kerwin C.J.C. said: "Once an article enters into the flow of
interprovincial or external trade, the subject-matter and all its attendant
circumstances cease to be a mere matter of local concern." 99
Rand J. said:
The regulation of particular trades confined to the Province lies
exclusively with the Legislature subject, it may be, to Dominion general
regulation effecting all trade, and to such incidental intrusion by the
Dominion as may be necessary to prevent the defeat of Dominion
regulation; interprovincial and foreign trade are correspondingly the
exclusive concern ofparliament....
... if in a trade activity, including manufacture or production, there is
involved a matter of extra-provincial interest or concern its regulation
thereafter in the aspect of trade is by that fact put beyond Provincial
power...
93. British Columbia (AG.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1937] A.C. 377 at 386.
94. Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board, [1938] A.C. 708.
95. Ibid. at 719.
96. PE.l. Potato Marketing Board v. Willis, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392.
97. Ibid. at 396.
98. [1957] S.C.R. 198.
99. Ibid. at 205 [emphasis added].
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A producer is entitled to dispose of his products beyond the Province
without reference to a provincial marketing agency or price, shipping
or other trade regulation; and an outsider purchaser entitled with equal
freedom to purchase and export.' 0
From the above decisions, it can be easily seen that interprovincial electricity
sales and the Hydro-Qurbec-NB Power utility would also fall under federal
jurisdiction under section 91(2) on the grounds that they would be matters
of interprovincial and international trade and commerce.
Just because the combined Hydro-Quebec and NB Power utility may
be subject to federal jurisdiction, this does not mean that it will be under
federal jurisdiction unless Parliament enacts new legislation. In Fulton,
Laskin C.J.C. said that "[u]nexercised federal authority may give leeway
to the exercise of provincial authority in relation to local works and
undertakings, and that is how I assess the situation here."'' He added,
"[a]lthough exclusiveness may arise even in the absence of federal
legislation, I do not regard the situation presented here as providing a basis
for its assertion."'0 2 Effectively, he was repeating the fourth rule in Fish
Canneries which states:
There can be a domain in which provincial and Dominion legislation
may overlap, in which case neither legislation will be ultra vires if the
field is clear, but if the field is not clear and the two legislations meet the
Dominion legislation must prevail: see GrandTrunk Ry. of Canada v.
Attorney-General of Canada.° 3
Therefore, in the absence of new federal legislation, provincial legislation
in Quebec and New Brunswick respecting interprovincial and international
electricity sales, rates and-tariffs and constructing interprovincial facilities
would continue to apply to a Hydro-Qurbec-NB Power interprovincial
utility. Currently, there is no new federal legislation on the horizon.
Regardless, we should not shy away from the question of whether
such new legislation is required and it is to that topic that we now turn.
VI. Why should the federal government act?
Why after all these years should the federal government try to enter the
Canadian electricity sector by enacting new legislation? The answer is
that Canada needs a national energy regulator, equal in stature to FERC
in the United States, to speak for Canada and to regulate in two areas:
100. Ibid. at 209-210 [emphasis added].
101. Supra note 74 at 162.
102. Ibid. at 164.
103. Canada (A.G.) v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1930] A.C. 111 (J.C.P.C.) at 118.
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responding to FERC and acting as the national electricity regulator. It is
my position that the logical body to fulfill this role is the NEB and that the
NEB Act should be amended to confer the necessary authority on the NEB
to do so. This would achieve the solution suggested by Owen Saunders
of obtaining an MOU with the United States respecting transnational
regulatory disputes. The NEB is the logical body to enter into a MOU
with FERC of the type he advocates because it has entered into a general
co-operation MOU with FERC already.'01 The real possibility of a new
Quebec-New Brunswick deal presents the perfect opportunity for the
federal government to act.
If Parliament were to give the NEB such authority, it would enable
it to respond to FERC on behalf of the Canadian electricity sector. Both
Canada and the United States would benefit from such a voice.
So empowering the NEB, in conjunction with its powers under Part
II of the NEB Act, would allow it to consider for the first time whether the
FERC rules adopted by provinces since 1995, designed to solve domestic
United States problems, are in the Canadian public interest. Electricity
economists always point out that the economies in the electricity business
lie in the savings from vertical integration; one CEO, one management
team, one legal department, one human resources department and system-
wide decision-making instead of several such groups and narrow decision-
making. Until 1995, Canada's province-wide utilities used that model
and made cheap electricity. Adaption of the FERC rules changed it. A
discussion of whether those changes have been beneficial to Canada is
long overdue.
In addition, empowering the NEB would allow the Canadian electricity
sector to speak to FERC with one voice and deliver one message on behalf
of Canada instead of having ten separate voices, The FERC decisions
described above show that ten separate voices have not served Canada
very well. The need to respond to FERC is a Canadian policy issue
important to all electricity consumers as well as Canadian nationalists.
The Hydro-Qurbec-NB Power deal presents a perfect occasion for the
federal government to address it.
As mentioned, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia and Prince
Edward Island require access to Hydro-Qurbec's and NB Power's
transmission system to earn export revenue from their hydro, tidal and
wind power electricity and it is in the national interest that they should be
104. Memorandum of Understanding between National Energy Board and Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, (10 May 2004) online: <http://www.neb.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rthnb/nwsrls/2007/nwsrlsl2-eng.
html>.
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able to do so. If a new Quebec-New Brunswick deal were to be completed,
one utility would in effect control all Canada/United States transmission
interfaces east of Cornwall. Disputes would become more frequent, might
involve other provinces and be even more contentious. In any case, the
federal government will inevitably be faced with having to balance Hydro-
Qudbec's transmission dominance with the economic aspirations of other
provinces.
After the acrimonious disputes between Quebec and Newfoundland
that have occurred in the past, it is hardly fair to expect Nalcor or
electricity producers in other provincesto agree to having their rights in
transmission disputes decided by either the R~gie or the New Brunswick
Energy and Utilities Board. 105 Those authorities are too closely-related
to Hydro-Qu6bec and NB Power to appear neutral. They approved the
OATTs whose interpretation or amendment may be in issue and all of their
members are appointed by the same governments who own and direct
either Hydro-Qu6bec or NB Power.
Parties in other provinces certainly would have an arguable claim
that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias created by those bodies.
Should the Rdgie or the Energy and Utilities Board ever deny a request
for transmission access to another province or impose terms considered
onerous, few would consider the process to have been fair. In Canada,
we do not allow tribunals to determine rights where they give rise to a
reasonable apprehension of bias, unless there is no other alternative. But
there is an alternative: this is to make the NEB Canada's national electricity
regulator and give it the power to decide all disputes about transmission
access on interprovincial transmission lines.
The required new legislation would not need to be extensive. First,
the bill should contain an amendment to the NEB Act that would makes
all provisions of part 111. 1 of the NEB Act, Construction and Operation
of Power Lines, which now applies only to international power lines
applicable, with necessary modifications, to interprovincial power lines.
This would allow the NEB to approve new interprovincial interconnections
and provide a forum for all stakeholder concerns.
Second, it should contain an amendment to the NEB Act that makes
the provisions of Part IV of the NEB Act, Traffic, Tolls and Tariffs, apply,
again with necessary modifications, to interprovincial and international
power lines. This would empower the NEB to prescribe, modify, amend
or approve transmission tariffs for interprovincial and international
transmission lines, resolve transmission access disputes on interprovincial
105. Supra note 5.
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and international power lines, and in an actual case order the construction
of new facilities and apportion the costs of such new facilities. It should
be clear that the NEB has the authority to set transmission charges for
interprovincial transmission even if they were lower or higher than charges
for intra-provincial transmission. It should also confer the authority to
reorder the transmission access queue in the public interest. This authority
would supersede provincial jurisdiction over interprovincial transmission
access and rates for such access.
Conclusion
If these amendments to the NEB Act are made, they would not seriously
diminish provincial control over electricity utilities or transmission
systems. Provincial utilities will still be able to meet their domestic loads
and export electricity to the United States. Canadians, however, would
have an independent and impartial regulator to decide all interprovincial
and national electricity issues and who exports when in the national
interest. This would create a true Canadian electricity system. A win/win
result for all. What's not to like?
